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Abstract
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of
agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distri-
butions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We show that, as the
market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms—including top trading cycles, se-
rial dictatorship, and their randomized variants—are uniformly asymptotically payoff
equivalent “up to the renaming of agents,” yielding the utilitarian upper bound in the
limit. This result implies that, when the conditions of our model are met, policy makers
need not discriminate among Pareto efficient mechanisms based on the aggregate payoff
distribution of participants.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D47, D61, D63.
Keywords: Large matching markets, Pareto efficiency, Payoff equivalence
1 Introduction
Assigning indivisible resources without monetary transfers is an important problem in modern
market design; applications range from allocation of public housing, public school seats,
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employment contracts, and branch postings to the assignment of human organs to transplant
patients. A basic desideratum in designing such a market is Pareto efficiency. If a mechanism
is not Pareto efficient, a surplus can be generated and distributed in a way that benefits (at
least weakly) all participants, suggesting clear room for improvement.
In a centralized matching market, achieving Pareto efficiency is often not difficult. A
number of mechanisms are known to produce efficiency, often satisfying additional desirable
properties in terms of incentives and (ex ante) fairness.1 Rather the challenge is often which
mechanism to choose among many Pareto efficient ones.
This issue is important because alternative Pareto efficient mechanisms often treat indi-
vidual participants differently (often dramatically so). For instance, in serial dictatorship,
individuals are allowed to choose objects, one at a time, from a set according to some serial or-
der; the first dictator (the first individual in the serial order) could very well select the object
that is regarded by all as the best, while the last dictator (the final individual in the order)
may have to settle for the object regarded by all as the worst. Without monetary transfers to
compensate for the loss borne by the latter, the apparent conflict of interests leaves little hope
for consensus in terms of selecting from alternative Pareto efficient mechanisms. Ideally, the
selection must be based on some measure of aggregate welfare of participants. For instance, if
one Pareto efficient mechanism yields a significantly higher utilitarian welfare level or a much
more equal payoff distribution than others, that would constitute an important rationale for
favoring such a mechanism.
A similar concern arises when the designer has additional policy considerations, such as
“affirmative treatment” of some target group (say, identified based on their socio-economic
background). Specifically, the designer may select an efficient mechanism based on such addi-
tional goals (for instance, by elevating the target agents’ serial orders in serial dictatorship).
Any such adjustment will obviously impact the welfare of the participants at the individual
level, but do these adjustment impact the total welfare of the agents or their aggregate payoff
distribution? If so, how? If accommodating additional social objectives were to entail a sig-
nificant loss of utilitarian welfare or to produce a significant distributive impact, this would
call into question the merit of the policy intervention. This type of policy consideration
requires one to evaluate the payoff consequences of alternative Pareto efficient mechanisms.
1Mechanisms such as (deterministic or random) serial dictatorship produce efficiency without regard to
existing property rights; top trading cycles mechanisms achieve efficiency by allowing agents to trade pre-
existing property rights or priorities (Shapley and Scarf (1974), Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)). These
mechanisms satisfy strategyproofness and can satisfy ex ante “equal treatment of equals” when the serial
order and initial ownership are drawn at random. Efficiency may also be achieved by allowing agents to
purchase the objects using “fake money” in an artificial market, as envisioned by Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979).
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Unfortunately, little is known about how alternative mechanisms perform in this regard.
The purpose of the current paper is to fill this gap while providing useful insights on
practical market design in the process. To make progress, we add some structure to the
model. First, we consider markets that are “large” in terms of the number of participants as
well as in the number of object types. Large markets are clearly relevant in many settings.
For instance, in the US National Resident Matching Program, approximately 20,000 medical
applicants participate in filling the positions of 3,000 to 4,000 programs each year. In New
York City, approximately 90,000 students apply to over 700 high school programs each year.
Second, we assume that the agents’ preferences are randomly generated according to some
reasonable distribution. Specifically, we consider a model in which each agent’s utility from
an object depends on a common component (i.e., a portion that does not vary across agents)
and on an idiosyncratic component that is drawn at random independently (and thus varies
across agents). Studying the limit properties of a large market with preferences randomly
generated in this way provides a framework for answering our questions.
Our main finding is that all Pareto efficient mechanisms yield aggregate payoffs, or util-
itarian welfare, that converge uniformly to the same limit—more precisely, the utilitarian
optimum—as the economy grows large (in the sense described above). This result implies
that in large economies, alternative efficient mechanisms become virtually indistinguishable
in terms of the aggregate payoff distribution of the participants. In other words, agents’ pay-
offs are asymptotically equivalent across different efficient mechanisms, up to the “renaming”
of agents. This result implies that there is no reason to favor one efficient mechanism over
another. From a policy perspective, this means that a Pareto efficient allocation favoring or
prioritizing a certain group of individuals would not significantly harm utilitarian welfare or
significantly alter the distribution of payoffs in a large market.
Importantly, our equivalence holds in terms of the distribution of ordinal ranks enjoyed by
the participants, making the result robust to the particular specification of cardinal utilities
assumed. The result is also robust to the institutional details that the efficient mechanisms
must accommodate (e.g., in terms of the property rights and priorities enjoyed by some
agents), which makes the result readily applicable to many practical market design problems.
To test the applicability of our results to realistic market settings, we compare alternative
efficient mechanisms using simulated data as well as field data from the New York City school
choice program. As will be seen, the comparison supports our equivalence result.
The present paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, our equivalence
result is closely related to and complements the equivalence result among a class of efficient
mechanisms established by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) and its extensions (Pathak
and Sethuraman (2011), Carroll (2014), Lee and Sethuraman (2011) and Bade (2014)). As
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we shall discuss in detail, this equivalence result holds only in the absence of prior ownership
or priority rights, i.e., when participants are treated ex ante symmetrically via fair lotteries.
By contrast, our result holds for arbitrary priority or ownership structures, as long as the
market is sufficiently large. This generality makes our equivalence result applicable to many
real-world settings where there are often priority considerations for participants (as was the
case with New York City school choice program).
Second, our result contributes to the literature on large matching markets, particularly
those with a large number of object types and random preferences; see Immorlica and Mah-
dian (2005), Kojima and Pathak (2008), Lee (2014), Knuth (1997), Pittel (1989), Lee and
Yariv (2014), Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2013) and Che and Tercieux (2015).2 The first
three papers are largely concerned with the incentive issues arising from the deferred accep-
tance (henceforth, DA) mechanisms of Gale and Shapley (1962). The last five papers are
concerned with the ranks of the partners achieved by agents on two sides of a market under
DA. We focus on the payoffs enjoyed by agents under efficient mechanisms. In a preference
environment closer to ours, Lee and Yariv (2014) show that stable mechanisms also yield
the utilitarian upper bound in a large market limit. As we show below via simulation and
data analysis, efficient mechanisms tend to converge much faster than do stable mechanisms,
and the magnitude of the difference can be considerable for realistic market sizes. Further,
our convergence result is robust, holding even for unbalanced markets, whereas their result
does not, as implied by Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2013). Most importantly, the uniform
equivalence of efficient mechanisms (possibly employing different priority structures) estab-
lished in the current paper is quite striking and has no analogues in the existing literature.
Methodologically, the current paper utilizes a framework developed in random graph the-
ory; see Dawande, Keskinocak, Swaminathan, and Tayur (2001), for instance. In particular,
the proof method is similar to the way Lee (2014) exploits the implications of the stability of
agents on two sides in a suitably defined random graph; as will be clear, our method exploits
2Another strand of literature studying large matching markets considers a large number of agents matched
with a finite number of object types (or firms/schools) on the other side; see Abdulkadiroglu, Che, and Yasuda
(2015), Che and Kojima (2010), Kojima and Manea (2010), Azevedo and Leshno (2011), Azevedo and Hatfield
(2012) and Che, Kim, and Kojima (2013), among others. The assumption of a finite number of object types
enables one to use a continuum economy as a limit benchmark in these models. At the same time, this feature
makes the analysis and the resulting insights quite different. The two strands of large matching market models
capture issues that are relevant in different real-world settings and are thus complementary. The latter model
is more appropriate for situations in which there are a relatively small number of institutions, each with a
large number of positions to fill. School choice in some districts, such as Boston Public Schools, could be a
suitable application because only a handful of schools enroll hundreds of students each. The former model
is descriptive of settings in which there are numerous participants on both sides of the market. Medical
matching and school choice in some districts, such as the New York Public Schools, would fit this description.
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the implications of Pareto efficiency for an appropriately constructed random graph.
2 Set-up
We consider a model in which a finite set of agents are assigned a finite set of objects, at most
one object for each agent. Because our analysis will examine the limit of a sequence of finite
economies, it is convenient to index the economy by its size n. An n-economy En = (In, On)
consists of agents In and object types On, where |In| = n. For much of the analysis, we
shall suppress the superscript n for notational simplicity.
The object types can be interpreted as schools or housing units. Each object type o has
qo ≥ 1 copies or quotas. Because our model allows for qo = 1 for all o ∈ On, one-to-one
matching is a special case of our model. We assume that total quantity is Qn =
∑
o∈On qo = n.
In addition, we assume that the number of copies of each object is uniformly bounded, i.e.,
there is q̄ ≥ 1 such that qo ≤ q̄ for all o ∈ On and all n. The assumption that Qn = n is made
only for convenience—as long as it grows at order n, our results will hold. In particular,
as will be clear, our argument will hold even in cases in which the market is unbalanced.
Similarly, the assumption that the number of copies of each object is uniformly bounded is
not necessary as long as it grows at a sufficiently low rate.3
Throughout, we shall consider a general class of random preferences that allow for a
positive correlation among agents on the objects. Specifically, each agent i ∈ In receives the
following utility from obtaining object type o ∈ On:
Ui(o) = U(uo, ξi,o),
where uo is a common value, and the idiosyncratic shock ξi,o is a random variable drawn
independently and identically from [0, 1] according to a uniform distribution.4
We further assume that the function U(·, ·) takes values in R+, is strictly increasing in the
common values and strictly increasing and continuous in the idiosyncratic shock. The utility
of remaining unmatched is assumed to be 0 so that all agents find all objects acceptable.5 The
symmetry of U(·, ·) can be seen as a normalization in the scaling of individual utilities, which
also implies a normalization invoked by many authors that the highest possible utility and
3As will be clear from footnote 23, we can allow q̄ = O(n/ log(n)).
4This assumption entails no loss of generality as long as the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is atomless
and bounded, as one can always focus on the quantile corresponding to the agent’s idiosyncratic shock as a
normalization and then redefine the payoff function as a function of this normalized shock.
5This feature does not play a crucial role in our result, which hold as long as a linear fraction of objects
are acceptable to all agents.
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the lowest possible utility are identical across all agents. The symmetry assumption serves
to normalize individuals’ cardinal utilities and thus discipline interpersonal comparison of
utilities. Further, as we will discuss in Section 5, our core findings are robust to the rescaling
of individual utilities. We assume that the agents’ common value for object type o ∈ O, uo
takes an arbitrary value in [0, 1] in an n-economy, and its population distribution is given by






interpreted as the fraction of the objects whose common value is less than or equal to u, and
by
Y n(u) =
|{o ∈ On|uo ≤ u}|
n
,
interpreted as the fraction of the object types whose common value is no greater than u.
Because qo ≥ 1 for each o ∈ O, it follows that Xn(·) ≥ Yn(·).
We assume that these CDFs converge to well-defined limits, X and Y , in the Lévy metric.
To be precise, for any two distributions F and G, consider their distance measured in the
Lévy metric:
L(F,G) := inf {δ > 0|F (z − δ)− δ ≤ G(z) ≤ F (z + δ) + δ, ∀z ∈ R+} .
According to this measure, any two distributions will be regarded as being close to each
other as long as they are uniformly close at all points of continuity.6 It follows that the limit
distributions X and Y are nondecreasing and satisfy X(0) = 0, X(1) = 1 and X(·)−Y (·) ≥ 0.
We assume that X has (at most) finite jumps. We allow X and Y to be fairly general, allowing
for atoms.
Several special cases of this model are of interest. The first is a finite-tier model. In this
model, the object types are partitioned into finite tiers, {On1 , ...., OnK}, where ∪k∈KOnk = On
and Onk ∩ Onj = ∅. (With a slight abuse of notation, the largest cardinality K also denotes
the set of indexes.) In this model, the CDFs Xn and Y n are step functions with finite
steps. This model offers a good approximation of situations in which the objects have clear
tiers, such as schools classified into different categories or regions or houses existing in clearly
distinguishable tiers. A further special case is when K = 1 in which the support of the
common value is degenerate and agents’ ordinal preferences are drawn iid uniformly. Knuth
(1997), Pittel (1989), and Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2013) employ such a model.
Another special case is the full-support model in which the limit distribution Y is
strictly increasing in its support. This model is very similar to Lee (2014) and Lee and Yariv
6Here, convergence of CDFs in the Lévy metric is equivalent to weak convergence.
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(2014), who also consider random preferences that consist of common and idiosyncratic terms.
One difference is that their framework assumes that the common component of the payoff
is also drawn randomly from a positive interval. Our model assumes common values to be
arbitrary, but with a full-support assumption, the values can be interpreted as realizations of
random draws (drawn according to the CDF Y ). Viewed in this way, the full-support model
is comparable to Lee (2014)’s, except that the current model also allows for atoms in the
distribution of Y .
Unless otherwise specified, we are referring to a general model that nests these two as
special cases. Fix an n-economy. We shall consider a class of matching mechanisms that
are Pareto efficient. A matching µ in an n-economy is a mapping µ : I → O ∪ {∅} such
that |µ−1(o)| ≤ qo for all o ∈ O, with the interpretation that agent i with µ(i) = ∅ is
unmatched. Let M denote the set of all matchings. All these objects depend on n, although
their dependence is suppressed for notational simplicity.
In practice, the matching chosen by the designer will depend on the realized preferences
of the agents as well as on other features of the economy. For instance, if the objects O
are institutions or individuals, their preferences over their matching partners will typically
impact which matching will arise. Alternatively, one may wish the matching to respect the
existing rights that individuals may have over the objects; for instance, if the objects are
housing, some units may be occupied by existing tenants who have priority over these units.
Likewise, a school choice matching may favor students whose siblings already attend the
school or those living nearby. Some of these factors may depend on the features not captured
by their idiosyncratic component. Our model is completely general in this regard.
Specifically, we collect all assignment-relevant variables, call its generic realization a
“state,” and denote it by ω = ({ξi,o}i∈I,o∈O, θ), where {ξi,o}i∈I,o∈O is the realized profile
of the idiosyncratic component of payoffs, and θ is the realization of all other variables that
influence the matching, and let Ω denote the set of all possible states. We make no assump-
tion on how θ is drawn and how its realized value affects the outcome. The generality on the
θ contrasts the current model with the others, many of which tend to impose a particular
random structure on the agents’ priorities (or objects’ preferences). For instance, Ashlagi,
Kanoria, and Leshno (2013) assumes that the preferences are iid, and Lee (2014) and Lee and
Yariv (2014) assume that the preferences consist of random common shocks with full support
and iid idiosyncratic shocks. Our results do not require any such assumptions on the object
side.
A matching mechanism is a function that maps from a state in Ω to a matching in
M . With a slight abuse of notation, we shall use µ = {µω(i)}ω∈Ω,i∈I to denote a matching
mechanism, which selects a matching µω(·) in state ω. Let M denote the set of all match-
7
ing mechanisms. For convenience, we shall often suppress the dependence of the matching
mechanism on ω.
A matching µ ∈ M is Pareto efficient if there is no other matching µ′ ∈ M such that
Ui(µ
′(i)) ≥ Ui(µ(i)) for all i ∈ I and Ui(µ′(i)) > Ui(µ(i)) for some i ∈ I. A matching
mechanism µ ∈ M is Pareto efficient if, for each state ω ∈ Ω, the matching it induces, i.e.,
µω(·), is Pareto efficient. Let M∗n denote the set of all Pareto efficient mechanisms in the
n-economy.
3 Payoff Equivalence of Pareto Efficient Mechanisms
We first define an upper bound for the utilitarian welfare—the highest possible level of total
surplus that can be realized under any matching mechanism. To this end, suppose that every
agent is assigned an object and realizes the highest possible idiosyncratic payoff. Because
the common values of the objects are distributed according to Xn, the resulting (normal-
ized) utilitarian welfare is
∫ 1
0
U(u, 1)dXn(u). This obviously yields the upper bound for the






The payoff distribution of an economy, whether a finite n-economy or its limit, can be
represented by a distribution function, i.e., a nondecreasing right-continuous function F map-
ping from [0, U(1, 1)] to [0, 1]. F (z) is interpreted as the fraction of agents who realize payoffs
no greater than z. We let F µ denote the payoff distribution induced by mechanism µ.
We are now in a position to state our main theorem.
Theorem 1. Let F ∗ be the distribution of payoffs attaining the limit utilitarian upper bound







In words, the theorem states that the distance (in the Lévy metric) between a payoff
distribution resulting from every Pareto efficient mechanism and that of the utilitarian upper
7We say Zn
p−→ z, or Zn converges in probability to z, where both Zn and z are real-value random
variables, if for any ε > 0, δ > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for all n > N , we have
Pr{|Zn − z| > ε} < δ.
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bound vanishes uniformly in probability as n→∞. More precisely, assuming the distribution
F ∗ is continuous, the statement is as follows. Fix any ε, δ > 0. Then, with a probability of
at least 1 − δ, the proportion of agents enjoying any payoff u or higher under any Pareto
efficient mechanism is within ε of the proportion of agents enjoying a payoff of u or higher
under the utilitarian upper bound for sufficiently large n. It is remarkable that the rate of
convergence is “uniform” with respect to the entire class of Pareto efficient mechanisms.









The theorem also implies that alternative Pareto efficient mechanisms become payoff










These results suggest that, as long as agents are ex ante symmetric in their preferences,
there is little ground to favor one Pareto efficient mechanism over another in terms of the
total welfare of participants or aggregate payoff distribution, at least in a large economy. This
has important implications for market design. As we already noted, designers often face extra
constraints arising from the existing rights or priorities of some participants over some objects,
or there may be a need to treat some target group of participants affirmatively. In addition,
there is a concern that accommodating such constraints or needs may sacrifice utilitarian
welfare or adversely impact the aggregate distribution of payoffs. Our result implies that
accommodating such constraints does not entail any significant loss in these terms in a large
economy, as long as Pareto efficiency is maintained.
4 Sketch of the Proof
Here, we sketch the proof of Theorem 1, which is contained in Appendix A. For our current
purposes, assume X(·) is degenerate with a single common value u0 and that X(·) = Y (·).
In other words, the agents have only idiosyncratic payoffs, and the matching is one-to-one.
As will be seen in Appendix A, the same proof argument works for the general case (with
some care).
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To begin, fix an arbitrary Pareto efficient mechanism µ̃. We first invoke the fact that any
Pareto efficient matching can be implemented by a serial dictatorship8 with a suitably-chosen
serial order (see Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998)). Let f̃ be the serial order, namely, a
function that maps each agent in I to his serial order in {1, ..., n} that implements µ̃ under a
serial dictatorship. Because µ̃ induces a Pareto efficient matching that depends on the state,
the required serial order f̃ is random.




∣∣∣Ui(µ̃(i)) ≤ U(u0, 1− ε) and f̃(i) ≤ (1− δ)n} .
The set Ī consists of agents who are within 1 − δ top percentile in terms of their serial
order f̃ but fail to achieve payoff ε-close to the highest possible payoff.9 Because ε, δ > 0 are




To prove this, we exploit a result in random graph theory. It is thus worth introducing
the relevant random graph model. A bipartite graph G consists of vertices V1 ∪ V2 and
edges E ⊂ V1× V2 across V1 and V2 (with no possible edges within vertices in each side). An
independent set is V̄1 × V̄2, where V̄1 ⊆ V1 and V̄2 ⊆ V2 for which no element in V̄1 × V̄2 is
an edge of G. A random bipartite graph B = (V1∪V2, p), p ∈ (0, 1), is a bipartite graph with
vertices V1 ∪ V2 in which each pair (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2 is linked by an edge with probability p
(independently of edges created for all other pairs). The following result provides the crucial
step for our result.10
Lemma 1 (Dawande, Keskinocak, Swaminathan, and Tayur (2001)). Consider a random
bipartite graph B = (V1 ∪ V2, p) where 0 < p < 1 is a constant and for each i ∈ {1, 2} and
|V1| = n and |V2| = m = O(n). There is κ > 0,
Pr
[
∃ an independent set V̄1 × V̄2 with min{|V̄1|, |V̄2|} ≥ κ ln(n)
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
8A serial dictatorship mechanism specifies an order over individuals and then lets the first individual—
according to the specified ordering—receive his favorite object; the next individual receives his favorite item
of the remaining objects, etc.
9Strictly speaking, we should focus on individuals receiving payoffs lower than U(u0, 1) − ε. However,
given that the utility functions are continuous, there is little loss in focusing our attention on agents receiving
less than U(u0, 1− ε). This point will be made clear in the proof.
10 The original statement by Dawande, Keskinocak, Swaminathan, and Tayur (2001) assumes that |V1| =
|V2| = n. It is easily verified that their arguments also apply under our more general assumptions.
10







Figure 1: Illustration of a random graph and sets Ī and Ō
This result implies that with probability converging to 1, for every independent set, at
least one side of that set vanishes in relative size as n→∞.
To prove our result, it therefore suffices to show that Ī forms a vanishing side of an
independent set in an appropriately-defined random graph. Consider a random bipartite
graph consisting of I on one side and O on the other side where an edge is created between




∣∣∣f̃(µ̃(o)) ≥ (1− δ)n}
be the (random) set of objects that are assigned to the agents who are at the bottom δ
percentile in terms of the serial order f̃ . See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the
construction, where the set I is ordered according to (a realization of) the serial order.
The key observation is that the (random) subgraph Ī × Ō is an independent set.
To see this, suppose the contrary—there is an edge between an agent i ∈ Ī and an object
o ∈ Ō in some state ω (as illustrated in Figure 1). By construction of Ī, agent i ∈ Ī must
realize less than 1 − ε of idiosyncratic payoff from µ̃ω(i). However, the fact that there is an
edge between i and o means that i would gain more than 1− ε in idiosyncratic payoff from o.
Thus, agent i must prefer o to his match µ̃ω(i). However, the fact that o ∈ Ō means that o
is not yet claimed and is thus available when agent i (who is within top 1− δ of serial order
f̃ω) picks µ̃ω(i). This is a contradiction, proving that Ī × Ō is an independent set.
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Next we observe that |Ō| ≥ δn, meaning that Ō never vanishes in probability. Lemma 1
then implies that set Ī must vanish in probability. Importantly, this result applies uniformly
to all mechanisms in M∗: If we define the sets Ī(µ̃) and Ō(µ̃) for each µ̃ ∈ M∗ as above,
for each µ̃ ∈ M∗, Ī(µ̃) × Ō(µ̃) forms an independent set of the same random graph! This
explains the uniform convergence.
Remark 1. If the mechanism µ̃ were a serial dictatorship with a “deterministic” serial order
f , a simple direct argument proves the result. First, let us note that we can think of each
agent as drawing his preferences “along the algorithm,” i.e., he draws his preferences for the
stage when it is his turn to make a choice. Obviously, the distribution of i’s preferences is not
affected by the choices of agents ahead of that agent in the serial order. Fix any arbitrary
ε, δ > 0 and let Ei be the event that at agent i’s turn to make a choice there remains at
least one object o such that Ui(o) ≥ U(u0, 1 − ε). Then, all agents except those in the
bottom δ-percentile serial orders enjoy idiosyncratic payoffs ε-close to the upper bound with
probability:
Pr{Ui(µ̃(i)) ≥ U(u0, 1− ε) for all i with f(i) < (1− δ)n}
≥Pr{∩i∈I:f(i)<(1−δ)nEi}
=1− Pr{∪i∈I:f(i)<(1−δ)nEci }
≥1− (1− δ)n(1− ε)δn → 1 as n→∞.
However, this argument does not work for an arbitrary Pareto efficient mechanism. For
a general Pareto efficient mechanism, the serial order implementing the mechanism is, in
general, not independent of the agents’ preferences (which is required in the last inequality
of the above string). Our general proof using random graph theory avoids this difficulty.
5 Implications and Robustness
We explore several implications of our findings. First, the utilitarian efficiency of Pareto
efficient allocations stated in Corollary 1 is remarkable and surprising given the fact that
monetary transfers are not allowed. One interpretation is that a large market makes utilities
virtually transferable by creating “rich” opportunities for agents to trade on idiosyncratic pay-
offs. In other words, objects that are uniformly valued by the participants can be transferred
from one set of agents to another set without entailing much loss in terms of the idiosyncratic
payoffs. In this sense, a large market can act as a “substitute” for monetary transfers. Such a
result, while plausible, is neither obvious nor universally true. This strong payoff equivalence
does not extend when the welfare of both sides are relevant. DA is Pareto efficient across
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both sides of the market—i.e., taking the objects as welfare-relevant entities—but, as shown
in Che and Tercieux (2015), it does not attain the highest total payoffs across the market,
and a different matching (which is Pareto inefficient) yields a higher utilitarian welfare.
Second, the current equivalence result is reminiscent of a similar equivalence result ob-
tained by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) between two well-known mechanisms, random
serial dictatorship and TTC with random ownership, and of the large market equivalence
result obtained by Che and Kojima (2010) between random serial dictatorship and a proba-
bilistic serial mechanism as well as their extensions (Pathak and Sethuraman (2011), Carroll
(2014), Lee and Sethuraman (2011) and Bade (2014)). While these results consider arbitrary
preferences on the agents, they assume ex ante symmetric random priorities with respect to
the objects. By contrast, our equivalence result does not impose any structure on the priori-
ties on the object side, allowing them to be arbitrary, but it does impose a certain structure
on the agents’ preferences (to consist of common values and iid idiosyncratic shocks). Our
result also holds only in the limit as the number of agents and objects becomes large (with the
number of object types bounded or growing at a slower rate), whereas the equivalence result
by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) and others holds for any finite economy. Ultimately,
the current result complements the existing focus on (ex post) Pareto efficient mechanisms
that treat agents symmetrically in terms of tie-breaking or ex ante assignment of property
rights. One implication of our result is that the fairness achieved by the symmetric treatment
of agents does not entail any significant welfare loss, neither in terms of utilitarian welfare
nor of the payoff distribution among agents.
Third, a similar result is known to hold under a stable matching in some large market
settings. Knuth (1997) and Pittel (1989), among others, have shown that if the agents’ ordinal
preferences are drawn iid uniformly and the market is balanced, the aggregate welfare of the
agents under a stable matching approaches the utilitarian upper bound.11 Lee and Yariv
(2014) show a similar result in a large balanced market in which the agents on both sides have
random preferences that consist of common and idiosyncratic shocks, and the common shock
has full support. It turns out that these conditions are important. Che and Tercieux (2015)
show that this result does not hold if the common value component of objects’ preferences
(or agents’ priorities with the objects) do not have full support. Even with preference drawn
iid uniformly on both sides, Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2013) find that if the market is
unbalanced, the agents on the long side compete excessively for agents (or objects) on the
short side in a stable matching, which entails a significant welfare loss for the former agents.
11Specifically, they show that the (preference) rank of the objects agents enjoy converges to log(n) on
average, which means that the idiosyncratic payoffs will be in the order of 1− log(n)/n on average. Because
the common values are degenerate in their environment, the result follows.
13
The general takeaway from these papers is that the outcome of DA is likely to be bounded
away from the utilitarian upper bound when there is competition among agents for desirable
objects. This suggests that even with full-support distributions and balanced markets, this
should be observed to some extent as long as agents’ preferences are sufficiently positively
correlated. This is indeed what we observe in our simulated data. In addition, we observe a
similar phenomenon in our analysis of field data from New York City, which suggests that in
real markets, DA entails a significant efficiency loss compared to Pareto efficient mechanisms.
See Section 6.
By contrast, our result is robust to market imbalance and to a general distribution of
agent priorities of objects. Specifically, our model makes no assumption on the latter, and
agents’ preferences allow for market imbalances. Suppose that the objects in our model exist
in two tiers with the common value u1 of tier-1 objects exceeding the common value u2 of
tier-2 objects by a significant margin. This will create an unbalanced market as far as tier-1
objects are concerned, and a similar competition by agents to obtain tier-1 objects will arise
under DA. Indeed, Che and Tercieux (2015) show that a stable matching mechanism is not
even approximately efficient in this situation. By contrast, the imbalance and associated
competition do not entail any significant welfare loss for the agents in a Pareto efficient
mechanism; specifically, competition for scarce resources does not entail significant losses for
those who are fortunate enough to be assigned them if the assignment is Pareto efficient.
Let us now come back to the structure we impose on agent preferences. We assume that
utilities are symmetric, i.e., the function U is not player dependent. While this serves as a
useful normalization, one may wonder whether our results depend on the particular scaling
of individual utilities. Scaling of individual utilities would matter at a superficial level, for
instance, if we scale up the utilities of some group of agents and keep the others the same,
efficient mechanisms that treat them differently would result in different aggregate utilities.12
However, there are important senses in which our insights are robust to the rescaling of
individual utilities.
First, regardless of how individual utilities are (re)scaled, in all efficient mechanisms, the
fraction of agents who receive an arbitrarily high idiosyncratic payoff converges to 1 as the
market grows large. Indeed, a large market still creates “rich” opportunities for agents to
trade on idiosyncratic payoffs, and thus, as the market gets large, the set of payoffs associated
with Pareto-efficient mechanisms still has a specific structure.
Second, on more normative grounds, given that we are using the utilitarian criterion
12Imagine two serial dictatorship mechanisms that yield systematically different serial orders based on
group membership.
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(which assigns equal weight to individual welfare), the symmetry assumption essentially re-
flects the idea that we are not willing to differentiate among agents.
Finally and most importantly, many institutions assess the performance of a mechanism
based on the distributions of “relative ranks” that agents achieve, namely, the ordinal rank
of the object obtained in each agent’s ranking divided by the number of objects allocated.13
Such a measure is clearly invariant to the scaling of the individual utilities. Our large mar-
ket equivalence result implies equivalence in this measure: as the market grows large, the
distribution of relative ranks becomes identical across all Pareto efficient mechanisms.14
6 Applicability of the Findings
What do our results imply for realistic markets? We study this question with two sets of
data: (1) simulated data and (2) choice data supplied by the New York City Department of
Education. Specifically, we shall compare across alternative efficient mechanisms using DA
as the benchmark. These exercises enable us to examine our theory in an environment that
involves: (1) a range of different market sizes, including relatively small market sizes, (2) a
broad range of preference and priority distributions, and (3) realistic quotas for object types
(e.g., schools).
6.1 Simulation
We first simulate our full-support model. Specifically, we assume that each agent’s preference
is given by U(uo, ξio) = uo + ξio, where uo and ξio are both generated according to a uniform
distribution from [0, 1]. Some of the mechanisms we consider also depend on the agents’
priorities or object preferences for agents, which we assume are given by V (vi, ηio) = vi + ηio,
where vi is the objects’ common preference for agent i and ηio is object o’s idiosyncratic
preference for agent i. We also assume that both vi and ηio are drawn according to a uniform
distribution from [0, 1]. Note that this preference/priority structure is a special case of our
model because priorities are arbitrary in our model.
We consider four different mechanisms: priority-based top trading cycles (PBTTC), two
versions of serial dictatorship (SD min and SD max), and Gale-Shapley’s DA algorithm.
13Featherstone (2015) is the first paper studying “rank efficient mechanisms,” i.e., mechanisms with rank
distributions that are not stochastically dominated.
14To be more precise, let us consider a cumulative distribution of normalized ranks where for each uo, a frac-
tion of individuals X(uo) have a relative rank smaller than 1− (X(uo) +
∫ 1
uo
Pr{U(u, ξio) < U(uo, 1)}dX(u)).
The cumulative distribution of normalized ranks of any Pareto efficient mechanism converges to this.
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PBTTC, proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003), executes Pareto-improving trades
among applicants in multiple rounds.15 For the two versions of SD, we randomly draw a serial
order of agents 100 times and select the best- and worst-performing assignment in terms of
utilitarian welfare. The purpose is to see the range of variations in utilitarian welfare associ-
ated with different Pareto efficient mechanisms. Finally, DA, proposed by Gale and Shapley
(1962), attains stable matching in a two-sided (i.e., agent-agent) matching environment.16
In the case of agent-object matching, the mechanism does not attain Pareto efficiency, but
we focus on the mechanism as a benchmark. DA is interesting in light of the recent result
by Lee and Yariv (2014) that it becomes approximately efficient in a large market given the
full support environment (on both sides) assumed here. Given this result, a natural question
arises as to how the convergence rates differ between DA and efficient mechanisms for realistic
market sizes.
Figure 2 shows the utilitarian welfare performance of the alternative mechanisms averaged
over 50 iterations of the preference and priority draws {(uo, ξio, vi, ηio)}i,o, measured in terms
of the aggregate values of ξio’s accruing to the agents.
17 (Recall that the common shock uo
affects all agents identically and thus can be subtracted without loss.)
All mechanisms, including DA, perform well and improve as the market grows large.
These results are in line with our main findings (in particular, Corollary 1) and with Lee and
Yariv (2014). What is not implied by these results and can be learned from the simulations is
the speed of convergence and the uniformity across mechanisms. For market size n = 2, 000,
all efficient mechanisms—even the SD min—realize more than 98% of the highest possible
surplus. The uniformity of convergences across efficient mechanisms is indeed remarkable,
for they become essentially indistinguishable for any n ≥ 1000. This shows that our uniform
15In each round, each applicant points to his most preferred object among those available, each object
points to the applicant with the highest priority for the object among those available, and the applicants
associated with a cycle (which must exist due to the finite number of participants) are assigned the objects
they point to and exit the market, along with the seats they are assigned. The same process is repeated with
the remaining participants, until all participants are exhausted.
16DA runs in multiple rounds. In each round, each agent proposes to the most preferred object that has
not yet rejected that agent, and the object chooses the most preferred agent among those that have proposed
up to that point. The algorithm iterates to the next round as long as some agents are rejected and have
acceptable objects remaining. When the process stops, the tentative assignment at the last round becomes
final.
17For the two versions of SD, for each preference draw, {(uo, ξio)}i,o, we run 100 serial dictatorship mecha-
nisms based on100 randomly drawn serial orders of the agents, and we select from among them the best- and
worst-performing assignments in terms of utilitarian welfare. (Hence, the priority draws {(vi, ηio)}i,o play
no role for SDs.) We then average the utilitarian welfare performances of the selected SDs over 50 random
preference drawings.
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Figure 2: Welfare Comparison across Mechanisms
asymptotic equivalence result “kicks in” for even moderately sized markets. Note that the
current equivalence result holds across different priorities and therefore is distinct from—not
implied by—the equivalence result by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) and its extensions.
Indeed, for very small n, the different between SD min and SD max is appreciable, suggesting
that the classical equivalence result is not applicable here. But even for a modestly large n,
the difference between the two mechanisms vanishes. Finally, although DA performs well
in utilitarian efficiency, there is a clear difference relative to the efficient mechanisms. For
n = 2, 000, there is a 3% point difference relative to SD min, and the tangible difference of at
least 2% point remains even for n = 10, 000. This suggests that the convergence rates differ
nontrivially between efficient mechanisms and DA.
We next study the robustness of our comparison. Figure 3 draws the preferences and
priorities in the same way as the baseline case but assumes that there are twice as many
agents as the objects. The performance of all efficient mechanisms in terms of utilitarian
welfare and their equivalence remain largely unchanged. The performance of the DA has
gotten significantly worse. This result is in line with Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2013)
17
























Figure 3: Welfare Comparison across Mechanisms
and Che and Tercieux (2015), which suggests that a significant welfare loss would result from
DA, as agents compete excessively for scarce resources.18
Such competition arises even in a balanced market if agents’ preferences are highly corre-
lated or equivalently if agents’ common preferences shocks become much more important than
idiosyncratic shocks. Figure 4 depicts such a scenario: the model is the same as above except
that agents’ common preference shock uo is now uniform on [0, 3]. Again, the performances
of the efficient mechanisms are quite robust to this change in the model, but the DA perfor-
mance is substantially worse than it is under the baseline model. In fact, the welfare loss is
comparable to that under the market imbalance. In other words, competition by agents to
realize high common value objects requires a significant sacrifice of their idiosyncratic payoffs
under a stable mechanism but not under efficient mechanisms.
18Although these papers show that the agents’ payoffs under DA no longer converge to the utilitarian
upper bound given market imbalance, this result is obtained in a simpler environment and does not directly
apply to the simulated setting.
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Figure 4: Welfare Comparison across Mechanisms
6.2 Calibration Based on NYC School Choice Data
In New York City, approximately 90,000 students (mostly in the 8th grade) are assigned to
over 700 public high school programs through an annual centralized matching process. We
focus on the main round (round 2) of assignment. In that round, each student submits a rank
ordered list (ROL) of up to 12 programs, and each program ranks applicants who listed it on
their ROLs, according to its priority criteria, which depend on the types of the program.19
The priorities are coarse for many programs, and a single (uniform) lottery is used to break
ties for all programs. Given the ROLs and priorities, a student-proposing DA algorithm is
used to generate an assignment.
We use the 2009-2010 choice data to calibrate the assignments that would arise under
alternative Pareto efficient mechanisms: priority-based top trading cycles (PBTTC), random
serial dictatorship (RSD), and priority-based serial dictatorship (PBSD). RSD is a serial
19The programs are categorized into several types in terms of admissions method: screened, limited un-
screened, unscreened, ed-op, zoned and audition. See Che and Tercieux (2015) for a detailed description of
the data and the institutional details.
19
dictatorship in which the applicants’ serial orders are determined at random. PBSD is a serial
dictatorship in which the applicants’ serial orders are based on the average priority rank of
the agents.20 We study the distribution of the ranks enjoyed by the participants under these
mechanisms. These mechanisms differ in the way that they treat the participants, so there
is no a priori expectation for the relation of the distributions.
Before proceeding, a couple of remarks are in order. First, following the existing litera-
ture, we assume that the observed ROLs of the applicants represent their truthful preference
ranking of top programs. This assumption is not entirely innocuous because the strate-
gyproofness of DA does not apply when the applicants’ ROLs are truncated (see Haeringer
and Klijn (2009)). Nevertheless, approximately 80% of the participants did not fill their
ROLs, suggesting that truncation was not a binding constraint (see Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak,
and Roth (2009) and Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal, and Pathak (2015) for the same assumption).
Second, under the current DA algorithm, programs do not specify priorities for students un-
less they rank them in their ROLs. To calibrate PBTTC, we assume that programs assign
lower priorities to students who do not rank them than to those who do rank them. This
does not pose a serious problem for our purposes because Pareto efficiency of PBTTC does
not depend on this assumption.21
Table 1 and Figure 5 present the distribution of preference ranks achieved by the applicants
under alternative efficient mechanisms, using DA as a control mechanism. They exhibit
striking resemblance in the rank distribution across alternative Pareto efficient mechanisms.
While the source of the resemblance is not immediately clear, the noticeable difference these
mechanisms exhibit relative to the DA outcome suggests that the resemblance is not driven
by the special nature of the underlying preferences.22 The difference also suggests that even
though DA may perform well in terms of efficiency in a large market, as suggested by Lee and
Yariv (2014), the convergence rate may be slow enough to entail an appreciable difference
20Specifically, we compute a student’s normalized priority rank (after a lottery draw) at each program to
which he/she applied. We then take the average across all programs that a student applied to. This yields
the average priority rank for each student. We then form a serial order of the students based on this order
(in the ascending order).
21If PBTTC were introduced, the priority information would be collected for all programs, regardless of
whether a student lists them on their ROLs. So, the outcome would not be the same. At the same time,
our finding below (as does our theoretical result) suggests that the difference in the distribution of preference
ranks achieved by the applicants will not be significant.
22For example, if all applicants submit the same ROL of programs, the rank distribution would be identical
across all assignments, and there would be no difference between DA assignment and efficient assignments.
Likewise, if there are no conflicts of interests, again, all agents will be assigned to their top choice under
both an efficient mechanism and DA. The difference between the DA and efficient mechanisms suggests that
neither scenario holds here.
20
Table 1: Rankings achieved under 4 different algorithms
DA PBTTC RSD PBSD
#1 35200.87 (53.67) 38090.25 (36.58) 37657.08 (51.03) 37784.47 (53.24)
#2 14006.8 (53.01) 13256.99 (46.08) 13307.03 (61.02) 13265.9 (53.12)
#3 8168.72 (41.93) 7157.68 (41.24) 7103.74 (51.6) 7190.1 (52.82)
#4 4882.67 (35.32) 4025.68 (31.32) 3983.21 (41.23) 4100.22 (39.46)
#5 2976.64 (29.75) 2382.62 (25.83) 2374.91 (34.81) 2484.59 (35.67)
#6 1716.71 (20.81) 1347.35 (21.12) 1343.15 (25.16) 1433.89 (28.34)
#7 996.4 (19.27) 746.87 (17.07) 789.61 (20.66) 851.97 (22.41)
#8 592.47 (16.46) 443.39 (12.92) 471.48 (15.55) 511.6 (16.47)
#9 336.74 (11.8) 265.24 (11) 287.17 (14.51) 304.6 (14.02)
#10 190.38 (9) 150.22 (8.26) 174.88 (11.12) 186.05 (11.11)
#11 122.17 (6.34) 100.79 (6.02) 112.97 (9.16) 126.66 (9.23)
#12 66.22 (5.41) 54.22 (4.9) 69.58 (7.64) 74.36 (7.01)
#Unassigned 8458.21 (29.31) 9693.7 (31.31) 10040.19 (47.17) 9400.59 (37.87)
Note: We ran 100 iterations of each algorithm with independent draws of lotteries and focused on
the average performance of each algorithm, including DA. Standard errors are in parentheses.
compared with efficient mechanisms.
Recall also that the programs have intrinsic priorities in the data, and the alternative
Pareto efficient mechanisms differ in the way that the programs’ priority information is used
to generate the assignment. Hence, the resemblance across alternative Pareto efficient mecha-
nisms cannot be explained by the equivalence result of Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) or
its extensions by recent authors. These authors focus on an environment in which programs
have no intrinsic priorities and find equivalence of efficient mechanisms that treat agents ran-
domly in an ex ante symmetric manner. Importantly, equivalence holds only in the ex ante
sense (in terms of the lotteries the agents receive), and it does not imply that a similar rank
distribution would result from different Pareto efficient mechanisms using different priority
systems.
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Figure 5: Rank Distribution under Alternative Mechanisms (averaged across 100 iterations).
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Preliminaries
For an n-economy and for each u ∈ [0, 1], let On≥u := {o ∈ On|uo ≥ u} and On≤u := {o ∈
On|uo ≤ u} denote the set of object types that yield the common value no less than u
and the set of object types that yield the common value no greater than u, respectively. The
numbers of objects with types in On≥u and O
n





notational simplicity, we shall suppress the dependence of these sets on n, with the exception
of Xn.
Now, consider any Pareto efficient mechanism µ ∈ M∗. By a well known result (e.g.,
Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998)), any Pareto efficient matching can be equivalently im-
plemented by a serial dictatorship mechanism with a suitably chosen serial order. Let SDfµ
be the serial dictatorship mechanism where for each state ω a serial order fµ(ω) : I → I, a
bijective mapping, is chosen so as to implement µω(·). That is, for each state ω ∈ Ω, the
serial order fµ is chosen so that SD
fµ(ω)
ω (i) = µω(i) for each i ∈ I. Since the matching µ
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arising from the mechanism depends on the random state ω, the serial order f implementing
µ is a random variable. In the sequel, we shall study a Pareto efficient matching mechanism
µ via the associated SDfµ . To avoid clutter, we shall now suppress the dependence of f on
µ.
Given an n-economy, for any Pareto efficient mechanism µ and the associated serial order
f , let
I≥u(µ) := {i ∈ I|f(i) ≤ Q≥u}.
be the set of agents who have a serial order within the total supply of objects whose common
values are at least u (in the equivalent serial dictatorship implementation). For any ε, the set
Īε≥u(µ) =
{
i ∈ I≥u(µ)|Ui(SDf (i)) ≤ U(u, 1− ε)},
consists of the agents who realize payoff no greater than U(u, 1 − ε) while having a serial
order within Q≥u. The following lemma will be crucial for the main result.
Lemma 2. For any ε, γ > 0,
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Proof. Fix any ε > 0 and γ > 0. We first build a random bipartite graph on I ∪ O
where an edge (i, o) is added if and only if ξi,o > 1− ε.
Now choose any δ ∈ (0, 1). For each µ ∈ M∗ and u, define random sets Iδ≥u(µ) := {i ∈
I |f(i) ≤ (1− δ)Q≥u}, Īε,δ≥u(µ) := {i ∈ Iδ≥u
∣∣Ui(SDf (i)) ≤ U(u, 1− ε)}, and
Ōδ≥u(µ) := {o ∈ O≥u
∣∣∃i ∈ µ−1(o) s.t. f(i) > (1− δ)Q≥u},
which consists of object types in O≥u assigned to the agents with serial order worse than
(1− δ)Q≥u.
We argue that the set I
ε,δ
≥u(µ)×Ōδ≥u(µ) must be an independent set of the random bipartite




Ui(o) > U(u, 1− ε) ≥ Ui(SDf (i))
where the strict inequality holds since ξi,o > 1− ε (i.e., (i, o) is an edge), o ∈ O≥u, and since
U(·, ·) is monotonic (in particular strictly increasing in idiosyncratic component). The weak
inequality holds because i ∈ Iε,δ≥u. In addition, we must have
f(i) ≤ (1− δ)Q≥u < f(i′), for some i′ ∈ µ−1(o)
23
where the first inequality comes from the fact that i ∈ Iε,δ≥u(µ) ⊂ Iδ≥u(µ) while the second
from the fact that o ∈ Ōδ≥u(µ). Thus, this means that when i becomes the dictator under
SDf , object o is still available. But Ui(o) > Ui(SD
f (i)) means that i chooses an object worse
than o, which yields a contradiction.
Since I
ε,δ
≥u(µ) × Ōδ≥u(µ) is an independent set for each µ ∈ M∗ and u ∈ [0, 1] and since
|I| = n, applying Lemma 1, we have that, for any γ′ > 0:
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as n goes to infinity.
Fix any γ′ > 0. Recall |Īε,δ≥u(µ)| ≤ |Iδ≥u(µ)| ≤ (1− δ)Q≥u and |Ōδ≥u|(µ) ≥ δQ≥u/q̄. Hence,
if |Īε,δ≥u(µ)| ≥ γ′n, then we must have |Ōδ≥u(µ)| ≥
δγ′
(1−δ)q̄n, where recall q̄ is the upper bound








∃µ ∈M∗ and u s.t. |Iε,δ≥u(µ)| ≥ γ′n and













where the convergence follows from (2).23





− δ − 1
|I|
for each µ ∈M∗. Hence, it follows that
Pr
[
∃µ ∈M∗ and u s.t.
∣∣Īε≥u(µ)∣∣
|I|
≥ γ′ + δ
]
≤Pr
∃µ ∈M∗ and u s.t.
∣∣∣Īε,δ≥u(µ)∣∣∣
|I|
≥ γ′ + 1
|I|
→ 0.
23 Here we use the assumption that q̄ does not increase in n. If q̄ increases in n at the rate of O(n/ log(n)),
then one can check that the lower bound in the above equation is ω(log(n)). Using Lemma 1, one can show
that Lemma 2—and thus Theorem 1—holds.
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Set δ and γ′ such that δ + γ′ = γ. Then,
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the statement, we will show that the payoff distributions induced by Pareto efficient
mechanisms converge to F ∗ in the sense defined earlier.







max {F µ(z − ε)− F ∗(z), F ∗(z)− F µ(z + ε)} ≥ ε
]
→ 0, (3)
where F ∗ and F µ are respectively the CDF of the payoff induced by the limit utilitarian
upper bound and the CDF of the payoffs induced by mechanism µ in M∗.
Let
Jµ(z) := {i ∈ I|Ui(µ(i)) ≤ z} .
denote the set of agents enjoying payoff of at most z under matching mechanism µ. Obviously,
F µ(z) = |Jµ(z)|/n. Let u(z) be such that U(u(z), 1) = z for each z ∈ Ẑ := [U(0, 1), U(1, 1)].
(This is well defined since U(·, 1) is continuous and strictly increasing.) Note that the function
u : Ẑ → [0, 1] so defined is continuous and increasing. Let us fix ε′ such that for any common
value u ≤ u(z) + ε′ we have U(u, 1) ≤ z + ε for each z ∈ Ẑ := [U(0, 1), U(1, 1)]. Note that
this is well-defined since U(u(z), 1) = z and U(·, 1) is continuous and strictly increasing.
Further observe that ε′ is strictly positive. Clearly, for any z ∈ Ẑ, any agent matched with
an object having common value no greater than u(z) + ε′ must be in Jµ(z + ε). This means
that |Jµ(z + ε)| ≥ Q≤u(z)+ε′ = Xn(u(z) + ε′)n for all µ ∈ M∗. By definition, for each z,















































(−Xn(u+ min{ε, ε′}) +X(u)) ≥ min{ε, ε′}
]
→ 0, (4)
as n → ∞. The first equality comes from the fact that for any z < U(0, 1), F ∗(z) = 0;
the first inequality is by definition of ε′ and the convergence follows since L(Xn, X) → 0 as
n→∞.
For the next part, recall I≥u(µ) := {i ∈ I|f(i) ≤ Q≥u} and Īε≥u(µ) :=
{
i ∈ I≥u(µ)|Ui(SDf (i))
≤ U(u, 1− ε)}, where SDf is the SD rule implementing µ. Let I≤u(µ) := {i ∈ I|f(i) ≤ Q≤u}.
We also extend the function u such that u(z) = 0 for any z ∈ [U(0, 0), U(0, 1)].
Fix ε′′ such that for any common value u ≥ u(z)− ε′′ we have z − ε ≤ U(u, 1− ε′′) for all
z ∈ [U(0, 0), U(1, 1)]. Note that this is well-defined since U(u(z), 1) ≥ z and U is continuous
and strictly increasing in both components. In addition, ε′′ > 0. Observe that U(µ(i)) ≤ z−ε





































































































where the convergence holds by L(Xn, X)→ 0 and Lemma 2.
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